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We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjects 
choose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and a 
costly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are the 
most frequent under role uncertainty (64%), selfish actions become the most frequent without 
role uncertainty (69%). Also, the frequency of surplus destroying choices is negligible with role 
uncertainty (1%) but not so without it (11%). A classification of subjects into four different 
types of interdependent preferences (Selfish, Social Welfare maximizing, Inequity Averse and 
Competitive)  shows  that  the  use  of  role  uncertainty  overestimates  the  prevalence  of  Social 
Welfare maximizing preferences in the subject population (from 74% with role uncertainty to 
21% without it) and underestimates Selfish and Inequity Averse preferences. An additional 
treatment,  in  which  subjects  undertake  an  understanding  test  before  participating  in  the 
experiment  with  role  uncertainty,  shows  that  the  vast  majority  of  subjects  (93%)  correctly 
understand the payoff mechanism with role uncertainty, but yet surplus creating actions were 
most frequent. Our results warn against the use of role uncertainty in experiments that aim to 
measure the prevalence of interdependent preferences. 
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1.  Introduction 
Role  uncertainty  is  a  commonly  used  experimental  procedure.  It  consists  of 
collecting  from  the  same  subject  responses  to  tasks  assigned  to  different  roles,  and 
letting a random mechanism determine which role’s actions will be implemented and 
used  for  payment.  Two  main  advantages  can  be  highlighted.  First,  it  increases  the 
information obtained from a given sample size of subjects. Second, it may facilitate the 
understanding  of  the  payoff  structure,  and  thus  strategic  thinking  in  games,  since 
subjects are asked to play under different roles. The justification behind its widespread 
use is that according to the standard game-theoretic view subjects’ behaviour should not 
be affected. 
Engelmann and Strobel (2004) understand role uncertainty as a reduced form of the 
strategy  method  (Selten,  1967)  for  normal  form  games.  The  strategy  method  is 
commonly used in sequential games to elicit responders’ choices to all possible decision 
nodes. Roth (1995) argued that this method transforms a sequential game into a normal 
form game and suggested future experiments to determine when/if the strategy method 
may produce differences in observed behaviour. See Brandts and Charness (2009) for a 
comprehensive review on the comparison of behaviour when the strategy and the direct 
methods are used.  
     In simple distribution experiments designed to identify and quantify interdependent 
preferences, such as the Dictator Game, role uncertainty is one available methodological 
option.
1 A distribution experiment requires at least two roles: a “Dictator” (“Decider” in 
our experiment), who decides an allocation of payoffs, and a “Receiver” who has no 
active role and simply gets paid according to the allocation proposed by the Decider. 
There are three ways in which these experiments are usually implemented. First, with 
role certainty, subjects are assigned specific player roles before decisions are made. 
Notice that no behaviour is elicited from half of the subjects despite being paid, which 
is seen in occasions as a waste of resources. Second, using role reversal, subjects play in 
both roles, once as a Dictator and once as a Receiver, and decisions in both roles are 
implemented  and  used  for  payment.
2  This  method  could  lead  to  endowment  effects 
stemming  from  expectations  of  what  other  subjects  may  have  chosen.  Third,  role 
                                                 
1  “Social  preferences”  and  “other-regarding  preferences”  have  been  used  to  refer  to  distributional 
preferences  as  well  as  reciprocity  concerns.  Since  our  setting  is  non-strategic  we  focus  on  purely 
distributional  preferences  and  thus  use  the  term  “interdependent  preferences”  to  refer  to  purely 
distributional  concerns.  See  also  Fisman  et  al.  (2007)  for  a  discussion  on  the  difference  between 
preferences for giving and social preferences. 
2 See for example Charness and Rabin (2002), Andreoni and Miller (2002), Andreoni et al. (2003), Burks 
(2003) and Fisman et al. (2007).   3
uncertainty, described above, offers a cost saving method without any endowment effect 
problem.
3  
This paper aims to compare individual behaviour in simple modified dictator games 
with  and  without  role  uncertainty.  We  use  modified  dictator  games  where  Deciders 
choose  among  three  available  actions,  a  selfish  action,  a  surplus  creating  action 
(altruistic behaviour) and a surplus destroying action (spiteful behaviour). Altruistic and 
spiteful  behaviour  comes  at  a  cost  for  the  Decider.  Our  initial  sessions  used  role 
uncertainty  to  increase  information  acquisition.  However,  the  strong  prevalence  of 
costly altruistic behavior drew our attention. This led us to question the use of role 
uncertainty  and  motivated  this  study,  which  aims  to  document  the  comparison  of 
making distributional choices with role uncertainty (RU) and with role certainty (RC).  
The  distribution  of  choices  changes  dramatically  depending  on  whether  role 
uncertainty is used or not. While the surplus creating action, consistent with altruistic 
behaviour, is the most frequently chosen action in the treatment with role uncertainty 
(64%), the selfish action becomes the most frequently chosen without role uncertainty 
(69%).  Also,  the  frequency  of  surplus  destroying  choices,  consistent  with  spiteful 
behaviour, is negligible with role uncertainty (1%) but not so with role certainty (8%).  
We  carry  out  a  within  subject  analysis  to  classify  subjects  into  four  different 
interdependent preferences-types: Selfish, Social Welfare Maximizing, Inequity Averse 
and Competitive preferences.
4 We show that the use of role uncertainty clearly affects 
the  preferences-type  distribution  in-line  with  the  distribution  of  actions  mentioned 
above. The majority of subjects (74%) are estimated to be Social Welfare maximizers 
with role uncertainty, but without it, the majority of subjects are estimated to be Selfish 
(44%),  while  Social  Welfare  maximizers’  frequency  decreases  to  21%.  Also,  the 
proportion of  Inequity  Averse individuals is small with role uncertainty (5%) but it 
increases to 25% without it. 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Charness and Grosskopf (2001) in their Study 2 and Engelmann and Strobel (2004).  
4 Charness and Rabin (2002) propose a utility function that includes all these types of interdependent 
preferences. We refer to the model presented on page 822 in their paper, where parameter q is set to be 
equal to zero (no reciprocity issues considered). Thus, there are only two relevant parameters in the 
model, r and s, the weights for others’ payoffs when ahead and behind respectively. Selfish preferences 
assume both r and s are equal to zero. Social Welfare maximizing preferences assume these two weights 
are strictly positive. It should be noted that our Social Welfare maximizer type is not based on the more 
general Social Welfare maximizer model depicted in their Appendix, in which there exists a trade-off 
between the total surplus and the payoff of the individual who is worst-off. Charness and Grosskopf 
(2001) find that this  more complicated Social Welfare  maximizer represents individuals’ preferences 
better. Inequity Averse preferences assume r is strictly positive while s is strictly negative and finally 
Competitive preferences assume both r and s are strictly negative.    4
The  use  of  role  uncertainty  may  add  an  element  of  complication  in  the 
understanding  of  experimental  instructions  affecting  subjects’  choices.  In  particular, 
subjects  may  not  fully  understand  the  fact  that  only  actions  taken  in  the  randomly 
determined role will matter, confusing role uncertainty with making choices under the 
veil of ignorance. Note that role uncertainty in the modified dictator games is definitely 
different from making choices under the veil of ignorance. This normative concept was 
introduced  by  Harsanyi  (1953)  and  Rawls  (1971)  to  describe  distributional  choices 
before a decider knows the realization of a “state of nature” referring to its position in a 
welfare  distribution  (poor  or  rich).  The  difference  is  that  while  under  the  veil  of 
ignorance  the  uncertainty  is  about  the  position  in  a  welfare  distribution,  under  role 
uncertainty  the  uncertainty  is  about  the  capacity  of  deciding.  Under  the  veil  of 
ignorance, once the position in a welfare distribution is known, the distribution chosen 
by a subject is always implemented. However, under role uncertainty, once the roles are 
randomly assigned, a subject finds out whether her choice will be implemented or not.
5 
However, subjects may not anticipate that in the case their randomly assigned role is 
that of the Receiver, their own allocation for the Receiver is not implemented but some 
other player’s allocation is used to determine Receiver’s payments. In fact, in the role 
uncertainty  treatment  a  common  answer  to  an  ex-post  experiment  questionnaire  in 
which  subjects  were  asked  to  justify  their  choices  read  as  follows:  “Just  in  case  I 
happened to be the Receiver, I chose the action that gave the highest total surplus”.
6   
This  raised  the  question  of  whether  the  subjects  fully  understood  the  payoff 
mechanism under the use of role uncertainty. We therefore replicated our experiment 
with role uncertainty including an understanding test right after the instructions and 
before they proceeded to take their actions. We will refer to this treatment as RU+T. 
The vast majority of subjects, 93.4% (56 out of 60 subjects), passed the understanding 
test successfully. Moreover, the pattern in behaviour is similar to the behaviour under 
the  role  uncertainty  treatment  without  the  understanding  test.  The  surplus  creating 
action is the most frequent (56%), followed by selfish action (40%), while the surplus 
destroying action is negligible (4%). With regard to the interdependent preferences type 
classification,  we  find  a  similar  distribution  to  that  of  role  uncertainty  without  the 
                                                 
5 Bolton and Ockenfels (2006) conducted an experiment in which subjects vote for distributions under the 
veil of ignorance, i.e., not knowing their position in the welfare distribution. Results are used to reply to 
Engelman and Strobel (2004) critique that efficiency concerns may be more prevalent than inequality 
concerns,  as  modeled  by  Bolton  and  Ockenfels  (2000).  They  find  that  choosing  under  the  veil  of 
ignorance and choosing when they know their relative position beforehand makes a difference. 
6 A translation of subjects’ answers to questions 2 and 3 in the questionnaire (see Appendix) is available 
upon request.   5
understanding test. The majority of subjects, 64% of them, are identified as behaving 
consistent  with  social  welfare  maximizing  preferences,  followed  by  selfish  (20%), 
inequity averse (14%) and competitive preferences (2%).  
     This paper contributes to the methodology of experiments by showing that the use of 
role  uncertainty,  compared  to  role  certainty,  can  significantly  change  the  observed 
prevalence  of  altruistic,  selfish  and  spiteful  behaviour  in  simple  modified  dictator 
games. Dictator  game  experiments have been regularly carried out using  either role 
certainty or role reversal procedures. However, when the simple structure of the dictator 
game is modified in order to study more complex aspects of interdependent preferences, 
namely in “distributional” or “modified dictator” games, role uncertainty has been used. 
We are aware of two previous experimental studies which have used role uncertainty in 
modified dictator games, Charness and Grosskopf (2001) and Engelmann and Strobel 
(2004),  to  study  issues  related  to  the  existence  and  quantification  of  interdependent 
preferences. Our study suggests that Charness and Grosskopf’s (2001) and Engelmann 
and Strobel’s (2004) results with respect to the prevalence of different interdependent 
preferences  may  be  partly  driven  by  the  use  of  role  uncertainty,  although  its 
implications are limited to a very low number of decision tables these authors use (1 out 
of 3 in Charness and Grosskopf, 2001, and 2 out of 11 in Engelmann  and Strobel, 
2004). Nevertheless our results should be interpreted as a cautionary tale for the use of 
role uncertainty in experiments which elicit interdependent preferences. 
  The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  second  section  describes  the 
experimental design and procedures. The third section reports the results and discusses 
the implications for Charness and Grosskopf’s  (2001) and Engelmann  and Strobel’s 
(2004) results. Finally, in the last section, we conclude. We also include an appendix, 
section 6, which contains the instructions used for the experiments.  
 
2.  Experimental Design and Procedures  
     Ten  experimental  sessions  were  conducted  in  the  Laboratori  d’Economia 
Experimental  (LEEX)  at  Universitat  Pompeu  Fabra  using  the  Z-Tree  experimental 
software  (Fischbacher,  2007)  in  November  2007,  February  2008  and  April  2010. 
Instructions  were  handed  out  in  Spanish.  A  total  of  260  subjects,  who  had  not 
participated  in  similar  experiments  in  the  past  and  who  did  not  know  what  the 
experiment  was  about,  were  recruited  using  the  ORSEE  recruiting  system  (Greiner, 
2004). In November 2007, we performed 4 sessions, with 20 subjects each, using role 
uncertainty (RU). In February 2008, we performed 3 sessions of 40 subjects each with   6
role certainty (RC). In April 2010, we performed 3 sessions, with 20 subjects each, 
using  role  uncertainty  and  an  understating  test  before  subjects  made  their  choices 
(RU+T). Subjects in all experimental sessions were chosen from the same subject pool, 
according to the same selection criteria and guaranteeing that no subject participated in 
experiments with and without role uncertainty. See Figure 1 for a summary of different 
treatments. Apart from whether role uncertainty was used or not, and whether there was 
an  understanding  test,  procedures  and  design  in  all  treatments  were  the  same,  as 
explained below. 
Figure 1. Summary of Treatments 
 
Date  Number of Sessions 
(Subject Number) 
Method  Total Number of Decisions 
for Each Decision Table 
November 2007  4 (80 Subjects)  Role Uncertainty (RU)  80 
February 2008  3 (120 Subjects)  Role Certainty (RC)  60 
April 2010  3 (60 Subjects)  Role Uncertainty with 
Understanding Test (RU+T) 
56 passed the  
understanding test 
 
      There are two player roles, “Decider” and “Receiver”. Deciders make choices in 
sixteen different decision tables which affect both Deciders’ and Receivers’ payoffs. 
“Receivers”  do  not  take  any  decision  that  can  affect  either  the  Receivers’  or  the 
Deciders’  payoffs.  In  the  RU  and  RU+T  sessions,  20  subjects  performed  the  task 
without knowing until the end of the experiment whether their role would be that of the 
Decider or the Receiver, which was randomly  assigned by the computer. The exact 
sentences explaining the random assignment mechanism were as follows: 
 
“The computer will also randomly choose whether you are the “Decider” or the “Receiver”. That 
is, the computer will randomly choose if the option you have chosen in that particular table is 
implemented, so that you will be the “Decider” or, on the other hand, if the option chosen by the 




Please  notice  that  chance  uniquely  determines  whether  your  role  will  be  “Decider”  or 
“Receiver”, once all participants have made their choices. Thus, the option you choose will only 
be taken into account if chance finally determines that for a particular table it is your option the 
one  being  implemented.  In  case  in  the  chosen  table  your  choice  is  not  the  one  being 
implemented, your choice is simply not taken into account and no participant is informed of it. 
Therefore, in case your choice is not being implemented, your choice can affect in no way 
your payment or the payments of any other participant”.   7
 
RU  also  included  two  examples  that  explained  the  payoff  mechanism  under  role 
uncertainty; one example covered the case when the subjects happened to be the decider 
and  one  when  the  subject  ended  up  being  the  receiver  (see  Instructions  in  the 
Appendix).  RU+T,  in  addition  to  the  two  examples,  included  an  understanding  test 
where  subjects  had  to  fill  in  gaps  that  if  correctly  answered  guaranteed  the 
understanding of the payoff mechanism under role uncertainty. 56 out of 60 subjects 
successfully  passed  the  test,  showing  that  the  vast  majority  of  subjects,  93.4%, 
understood  the  instructions  with  role  uncertainty.  Similarly,  RC  also  included  an 
example explaining the payoff mechanism (see Instructions in the Appendix). 
    In the RC sessions, 40 subjects were recruited and after arrival they extracted a 
piece of paper from a bag which randomly determined whether they would stay in the 
laboratory and play as Deciders, or they would go to a different classroom and play as 
Receivers.  In the RU  and RU+T sessions  all subjects were in the same room.  It is 
unlikely that differences in our results are due to physical separation since we used 
cubicles in all sessions, making visual contact among subjects almost impossible.   
       Experimental sessions in the RU and RC treatments lasted one and a half hours 
because the experiment contained three different tasks. Experimental sessions in the 
RU+T treatment lasted half an hour, since subjects only performed one task. The focus 
of  this  paper  is  on  the  first  task,  which  all  subjects  performed  in  their  respective 
experiments. The first part is totally independent of the rest of the tasks since subjects 
did not find out about the task in each part until that part was reached. The other two 
tasks  in  the  RU  and  RC  treatments  consisted  in  eliciting  beliefs  about  how  other 
subjects chose in these same tables and repeating the first task once subjects learned 
how  others  have  chosen  in  the  first  task.  More  information  about  the  other  tasks, 
together with complete instructions, can be found in Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2008a). 
       Throughout  the  experiment  we  ensured  anonymity  and  effective  separation  of 
subjects.  All  subjects  in  the  RU  and  RU+T  sessions  and  only  Deciders  in  the  RC 
sessions made choices which determined the payoffs for both Deciders and Receivers, 
although  both  Deciders  and  Receivers  were  equally  aware  of  the  task  and  decision 
tables of the Deciders. Receivers in the RC sessions filled in a voluntary questionnaire 
that had no influence on their payoffs.   8
        All subjects were shown sequentially the same sixteen tables with three options 
describing the allocation of experimental units between two subjects, as illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Illustrative Decision Table 
 
  Selfish Action  Surplus Creating Action  Surplus Destroying Action 
Decider  X  x-1  x-1 
Receiver  Y  y+s  y-s 
 
One of the options contained the highest number of experimental units for the Decider. 
We will refer to this option as the selfish action. Another option was designed such that 
the  Decider  would  lose  one  experimental  unit  in  order  to  increase  the  Receiver’s 
allocation in s>1 units (surplus creating action). The third option was designed such 
that the Decider would lose one experimental unit but now in order to decrease the 
Receiver’s allocation in s>1 units (surplus destroying action). Different options were 
presented  using  neutral  labels  (“Option  1”,  “Option  2”  and  “Option  3”)  and  we 
randomly varied the order among the selfish, surplus creating and surplus destroying 
actions from table to table, as shown in Figure 3. The sixteen tables differed in the 
number of created/destroyed units, s, and on whether the Decider was ahead (better-off 
than) or behind (worse-off than) the Receiver (x>y or x<y). These variations allowed us 
the identification of different interdependent preferences-types. 




Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 2 
(s=5) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  7  7  8    Decider  16  17  16 




Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 4 
(s=7) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  20  19  19    Decider  10  10  11 




Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 6 
(s=3) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  17  16  16    Decider  8  7  7 




Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 8 
(s=5) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  17  16  16    Decider  8  7  7 




Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 10 
(s=4) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  13  14  13    Decider  4  5  4 
Receiver  5  11  17    Receiver  24  20  16 
 
 
   9
Table 11 
(s=7) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 12 
(s=4) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  16  16  17    Decider  20  19  19 




Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 14 
(s=6) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  4  4  5    Decider  7  7  8 




Option 1  Option 2  Option 3    Table 16 
(s=5) 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  13  13  14    Decider  10  10  11 




     At the end of the experiment one decision table was randomly chosen to determine 
payments.
  7  All  subjects  received  a  3  Euro  participation  fee.  In  the  RU  and  RU+T 
sessions,  subjects  received  the  experimental  units  allocated  to  “Decider”  in  the 
randomly chosen table, in case they turned out to be Deciders and the experimental 
units allocated to “Receiver” by their randomly matched “Decider” in case they turned 
out to be Receivers. In the RC sessions Deciders received the experimental units they 
allocated  to  “Decider”  in  the  randomly  chosen  table  and  their  randomly  matched 
Receiver got the units allocated to “Receiver”. 
 
3.  Results 
     Table 1 reports the number of times each of the available actions, selfish, surplus 
creating  and  surplus  destroying  actions,  were  chosen  in  the  RU,  RU+T  and  RC 
treatments,  separately  for  whether  the  Decider  is  originally  ahead  or  behind  the 
Receiver in terms of payoffs. It also shows the average play across subjects, as well as 
the frequency of play of each type of action.  
      We will first concentrate on the frequency of play for the selfish, surplus creating 
and  surplus  destroying  actions.  Two  differences  are  most  notable.  First,  the  selfish 
action is the most frequently chosen in all decision tables under role certainty (RC), 
while the surplus creating action is the most chosen in all but one decision table in the 
RU treatment and in all but four tables in the RU+T treatment. In the eight tables in 
which  the  decider  is  ahead,  the  selfish  action  is  most  frequent  in  the RC  treatment 
(66%), while in the RU and RU+T treatments the surplus creating action was chosen 
                                                 
7 Paying for one randomly chosen decision instead of paying for all the decisions has become a standard 
method in experimental economics and it may help avoiding wealth effects. Experimental work on testing 
for differences in behavior coming from paying for all decisions versus paying for a randomly chosen 
decision is limited. Hey and Lee (2005) test for this in the laboratory and they find that indeed subjects’ 
behavior is not affected by whether subjects are paid for one randomly chosen decision instead of paying 
for all the decision tables.   10
with  highest  frequency  (69%  in  RU  and  64%  in  RU+T).  In  the  8  tables  where  the 
decider is behind, again the selfish action is the most frequent under RC (72%), while 
the  surplus  creating  action  is  most  frequent  under  RU  (59%).  Selfish  and  surplus 
creating actions are balanced under RU+T. It is interesting to see that the inclusion of 
the understanding test increases the frequency of selfish actions when the decider is 
behind, although it is still far away from the frequency of selfish actions observed under 
RC.  However,  there  are  no  differences  in  the  frequency  of  surplus  creating  actions 
between the RU and RU+T treatments when the decider is ahead. Second, the surplus 
destroying action is barely chosen in the RU and RU+T treatments (1% and 4% of the 
times,  respectively)  while  it  is  chosen  with  low  but  positive  frequency  in  the  RC 
treatment, especially when the Decider is behind (11%).  
      Pair-wise comparisons using Fisher exact probability test for the number of times 
each option is chosen in each of the 16 tables in the RU and RC treatments, and in the 
RU+T and RC treatments, show statistical significant differences for all decision tables 
at  the  5%  significance  level.  Pair-wise  comparisons  using  Fisher  exact  probability 
comparing the RU and RU+T treatments do not show statistical significant differences 
in any but one of the 16 decision tables at the 5% significance level (the exception is 
given by Table 15).  
 
Table 1. Actions With and Without Role Uncertainty 
    Decider’s Position: Ahead 
(8 Tables) 
Decider’s Position: Behind 
(8 Tables) 
 




































Stand. Dev.  (3.23)  (3.23)  (0.35)  (2.88)  (2.99)  (0.71)  -- 
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Stand. Dev.  (2.49)  (2.66)  (0.53)  (2.54)  (2.67)  (0.66)  -- 
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of Actions  316  142  22  346  80  54 
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2.37   
16 
Stand. Dev.  (2.79)  (2.65)  (1.13)  (2.54)  (2.17)  (1.90)  -- 
Frequency of 





       
      We now show the classification of subjects into four different preferences-types, 
Selfish (SF), Social Welfare maximizing (SW), Inequity Averse (IA) and Competitive 
(CP).  The  identification  strategy  for  the  preferences-types  classification  is  based  on 
Charness and Rabin’s (2002) piece-wise linear utility function, shown in equation (1). 
Deciders’  utility  (uD)  depends  on  both  Decider’s  own  payoff  ( D p )  and  Receiver’s 
payoff ( R p ). The two key parameters are the weight on the Receiver’s payoff, r, when 
the Decider is ahead of the Receiver ( R D p p > ) and, the weight, s, when the Decider is 
behind the Receiver ( D R p p >  ).  
  
(1)  D R D R D s r s r u p s r p s r p p ) 1 ( ) ( ) , ( - - + + =   
 
where r = 1 if  R D p p > , and r = 0 otherwise, and s = 1 if  R D p p < , and s = 0 otherwise. 
 
Each  Decider  i  at  decision  table  t,  has  three  available  actions,  a={S,C,D}, 
referring to selfish, surplus creating and surplus destroying actions respectively. Notice 
that SF Deciders should always choose the selfish action. SW Deciders should choose 
either the surplus creating or the selfish action regardless of their relative position and 
depending on the value of s. IA Deciders should choose either the surplus creating or 
the selfish action when ahead, but either the selfish or the surplus destroying action 
when behind. Finally, CP Deciders should choose either the surplus destroying or the 
selfish action, regardless of their relative position and again depending on the value of s. 
We  also  allow  individuals  to  make  uniform  iid  errors,  e,  which  implies  that  with 
probability  e  each available action will be taken with equal probability. Notice that 
errors  include  two  types  of  behavior.  The  most  severe  type  of  mistake  consists  of 
choosing an action not compatible with the estimated preferences type. For example, 
choosing a surplus destroying (creating) action for a subject whose preferences are of 
the type SW (CP). The less severe mistake consists in choosing a costly action at some 
price, but not choosing it at lower price. For example, choosing to create surplus when 
s=2 but not when s=7.    12
Our  econometric  specification  follows  a  mixture-of-types  model  as  explained  in 
detail in Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2008a). Based on Charness and Rabin’s (2002) piece-
wise linear utility function, a preferences-type k, where we consider the four different 
types described above, will be defined by the sign the parameters r and s may take. We 
estimate a triple (r,s,e) for each individual i and classify subjects according to the sign 
of these parameters. If r and s are both consistent with being zero then this subject will 
be classified under SF preferences type. If r and s are both estimated to be strictly 
greater than zero then this subject will be classified under SW preferences type. If r is 
estimated to be greater than zero and s is estimated to be strictly smaller or equal to 
zero then this subject will be classified under IA preferences type. Finally, if r and s are 
both estimated to be negative or r is estimated to be zero but s is estimated to be strictly 
negative  then  this  subject  will  be  classified  under  CP  preferences  type.  After  this 
estimation we calculate the preferences-type distribution ( k p ) for the treatments with 
and without role uncertainty, shown in Table 2. Some subjects were estimated within an 
interdependent preferences type with a high level of noise ( 38 . 0 ˆ > e ), or their type was 
not clear (r and s accepted a range of possible values that made impossible a unique 
classification). We excluded those subjects from this classification, such that we are left 
with 70 subjects out of 80 for RU, 44 subjects out of 56 for RU+T treatment and 52 out 
of 60 subjects for RC. Yet, we were able to classify with this method between 79% and 
88%  of  the  subjects.  Table  2  also  shows  the  estimation  of  parameters  for  each 
preferences-type averaged across subjects within the type. 
 
Table 2. Interdependent Preferences-Type Distribution 
With and Without Role Uncertainty 
   
Role Uncertainty (RU) 




Role Uncertainty (RC) 
 
k p   k r   k s   k e   k p   k r   k s   k e   k p   k r   k s   k e  
SF  0.21  --  --  0.04  0.20  --  --  0.00  0.44  --  --  0.03 
SW  0.74  0.33  0.29  0.11  0.64  0.31  0.27  0.11  0.21  0.25  0.21  0.18 
IA  0.04  0.25  0.00  0.16  0.14  0.33  -0.09  0.17  0.25  0.24  -0.16  0.21 
CP  0  --  --  --  0.02  -1.01  -0.51  0.28  0.10  -0.34  -0.38  0.07 
Log Likelihood  -261.11  -164.27  -217.99 
       
      We  now  focus  on  the  preferences-type  distribution  shown  in  bold  in  Table  2. 
Consistent  with  the  analysis  of  the  frequency  of  actions,  the  preferences-type 
distribution  is  significantly  affected  with  the  use  of  role  uncertainty.  In  the  role   13
uncertainty treatments the most frequent type is SW (74% in RU and 64% in RU+T), 
followed by SF (21% in RU and 20% in RU+T), while few subjects are classified as IA 
and CP (4% in RU and 14% in RU+T for IA, and 0% in RU and 2% in RU+T for CP). 
On the other hand, in the RC treatment, SF type was the most frequent type (44%), 
followed by IA and SW with similar proportions (25% and 21% respectively). Finally, 
10% of the subjects were classified as CP. 
      We conclude that the use of role uncertainty leads to different individual behaviour 
when  compared  to  behaviour  using  role  certainty  in  modified  dictator  games. 
Furthermore,  this  difference  is  not  due  to  the  poor  understanding  of  instructions 
regarding the payoff mechanism under role uncertainty. The treatment which includes 
this  understanding  test  shows  similar  results,  showing  again  significant  differences 
compared to behaviour under role certainty. All subjects included in the analysis did 
pass the understanding test, such that we can rule out that the instructions regarding the 
payoff mechanism under role uncertainty were incorrectly understood.  
In  light  of  our  results,  we  now  discuss  the  findings  of  Charness  and  Grosskopf 
(2001) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004).  
Charness and Grosskopf (2001) use role uncertainty in their Study 2 where subjects 
make three decisions, shown in Figure 4. In Decision 1, subjects choose between a 
selfish action (B1) and a costly surplus creating action (B2) and they find that B2 is 
chosen with the highest frequency (66.7%). In Decision 2, subjects choose between a 
selfish  and  at  the  same  time  costly  surplus  creating  action  and  an  equal  payoff 
distribution.  They  find  that  B1  is  chosen  with  highest  frequency  (88%).  Finally,  in 
Decision  3,  subjects  choose  between  a  selfish  and  a  surplus  creating  action  which 
involves no cost, that is, both actions yield the same payoff for the decider. They find 
that  the  large  majority  (74.1%)  chooses  to  create  the  maximum  possible  quantity 
(x=1200).  While  our  results  do  not  imply  that  there  would  be  any  change  in  the 
frequencies observed in decisions 2 and 3 had role certainty been used since deviating 
from the selfish action implies no cost for the decider (and it is actually profitable in 
Decision 2), they do imply that the high prevalence of surplus creating actions (B2) 




                                                 
8 Choosing the surplus creating action when it involves no cost for the Decider is consistent with a 
preferences type proposed by Fisman et al. (2007) called lexicographic self. We cannot separate this type 
from other preferences types so our results have no implications for the decision tables that present such 
choices.   14
Figure 4. Decision Tables in Study 2 in Charness and Grosskopf (2001) 
 
  Decision 1  Decision 2  Decision 3 
  B1  B2  B1  B2  B1  B2 
Decider  625  600  625  600  600  600 
Receiver  625  1200  1200  600  600  1200 300 £ £ x  
Choice  33.3%  66.7%  88%  12%  74.1% x=1200 
 
Engelmann and Strobel (2004) design 3-player modified dictator games, which aim 
to distinguish between two types of inequity aversion preferences, those proposed by 
Fehr  and  Schmidt  (1999)  and  those  by  Bolton  and  Ockenfels  (2000),  as  well  as  to 
separate inequity aversion preferences from efficiency and maximin motives, very close 
in  spirit  to  SW  maximizing  preferences.  Figure  5  includes  their  three  sets  of 
distributional  games.  The  first  and  third  sets  of  games  have  the  property  that  the 
decision maker gets exactly the same payoff no matter her chosen action and thus, there 
is  no  cost  for  the  decider  when  choosing  surplus  creating  or  destroying  action  (see 
footnote 9). Among the second set of games, only games Ny and Nyi  separate between 
the selfish (C) and the costly surplus creating actions (A). The authors find that the most 
frequent choice is that of surplus creating action and not the selfish action, in both Ny 
(76.7% vs. 10%) and Nyi (60% vs. 23.3%). Our results imply that the high frequency of 
surplus  creating  choices  in  these  two  tables  may  be  driven  by  the  use  of  role 
uncertainty. Engelmann and Strobel (2004) included, unlike Charness and Grosskopf 
(2001),  control  treatments  replicating  some  of  their  tables  with  role  certainty. 
Unfortunately for our research purposes, their robustness check was only done for tables 
in which the Decider’s payments are not affected by her choice (table Ex from set 1 and 
table P from set 3), while our results imply that the affected decision tables would be Ny 
and Nyi.
9       
     Figure 5. Decision Tables in Engelmann and Strobel (2004) 
 
  F  E  Fx  Ex 
  A  B  C  A  B  C  A  B  C  A  B  C 
Receiver 1  8.2  8.8  9.4  9.4  8.4  7.4  17  18  19  21  17  13 
Decider  5.6  5.6  5.6  6.4  6.4  6.4  10  10  10  12  12  12 
Receiver 2  4.6  3.6  2.6  2.6  3.2  3.8  9  5  1  3  4  5 





                                                 
9 Notice that Engelmann and Strobel’s (2004) tables involve three players, while our tables only involve 
two players. This is important since it is not clear how the veil of ignorance line of reasoning, which we 
believe is the source of the confusion, would differ between two-player and three-player games when the 
decider’s payoffs are kept constant independently of the chosen action.   15
  N  Nx  Ny  Nyi 
  A  B  C  A  B  C  A  B  C  A  B  C 
Receiver 1  16  13  10  16  13  10  16  13  10  16  13  10 
Decider  8  8  8  9  8  7  7  8  9  7.5  8  8.5 
Receiver 2  5  3  1  5  3  1  5  3  1  5  3  1 
Freq. 
Choice 
70%  26.7%  3.3%  83.3%  13.3%  3.3%  76.7%  13.3%  10%  60%  16.7%  23.3% 
 
 
  R  P  Ey 
  A  B  C  A  B  C  A  B  C 
Receiver 1  11  8  5  14  11  8  21  17  13 
Decider  12  12  12  4  4  4  9  9  9 
Receiver 2  2  3  4  5  6  7  3  4  5 
Freq. Choice  26.7%  20%  53.3%  60%  6.7%  33.3%  40%  23.3%  36.7% 
 
Our results do not invalidate in any way the general results found in Charness and 
Grosskopf (2001) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004), because they only affect a very 
limited subset of the games they use (1 out of 3 in Charness and Grosskopf, 2001, and 2 
out of 11 in Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). Also, we have to be careful in exporting our 
results to theirs. Their instructions were different from ours in important details such as 
the  inclusion  of  examples  and  the  understanding  test,  which  always  raises  question 
about the  external validity of our  results to their experiments. However, our  results 
definitely warn against the use of role uncertainty in future experimental designs aiming 
to identify different motives behind non-selfish behavior.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
We find that role uncertainty exacerbates the presence of altruistic behavior and 
dissipates the presence of selfish and spiteful behavior in a simple modified dictator 
games  experiment  aimed  to  identify  interdependent  preferences  types.  This  method 
yields a preferences-type distribution with a significant upward bias on the frequency of 
Social  Welfare  maximizing  preferences  and  a  significant  downward  bias  on  the 
estimation of the frequencies of Selfish, Inequity Averse and Competitive preferences.  
      A  control  treatment  with  role  uncertainty,  but  in  which  subjects  performed  an 
understanding test prior to the experiment, shows a similar pattern in behavior to that of 
role uncertainty and no understanding test. Given this result and the fact that almost all 
subjects in the RU+T treatment passed the understanding test, we conclude that the 
higher frequency of welfare maximizing behavior under role uncertainty is not due to 
subjects  not  understanding  the  payoff  mechanism  under  role  uncertainty  in  the 
instructions. We conclude that, although subjects did understand the payment procedure   16
under role uncertainty there is something inherent to the role uncertainty procedure that 
makes them choose differently than under role certainty. 
In  line  with  Camerer  (2003),  Smith  (2008)  and  Cox  (2010),  who  highlight  the 
fragility of dictator game experimental results to procedural changes, further research on 
whether  and  when  cost-saving  experimental  methods  affect  conclusions  obtained  in 
experiments is thus warranted. 
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6.  Appendix: Instructions. 
 
Below you can find a translation of the experimental instructions which were handed to 
all subjects in the treatments with Role Uncertainty (RU and RU+T) and to Deciders in 
the treatment with Role Certainty (RC). Instructions in treatments RU and RU+T were 
identical, apart from omitting any reference to “Parts 2 and 3 of the experiment” in the 
instructions for the RU+T treatment. A summary of instructions appeared on subjects’ 
screens before each part. Complete instructions for the other two tasks subjects did in 
Part 2 and Part 3 of the RU and RC treatments can be found in Iriberri and Rey-Biel 
(2008a). Before starting the experiment, participants in the RU+T treatment answered 
the understanding test, which is reproduced in section 6.2. 
 
6.1. Instructions with Role Uncertainty (RU and RU+T) 
 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN OUR EXPERIMENT! 
     
This is an experiment and thus, no talking, looking-around or walking is allowed. If you have any 
question or need help please raise your hand and one of the researchers will assist you. If you do not   18
follow the indicated rules, WE WILL ASK YOU TO LEAVE THE EXPERIMENT AND YOU 
WILL NOT RECEIVE ANY PAYMENT. Thank you. 
 
This experiment is about individual decisions. Both Pompeu Fabra and  Autònoma de Barcelona 
universities have provided funds to carry it out. You will receive 3 euros for having arrived on 
time.  Additionally,  if  you  follow  the  instructions  correctly  you  may  earn  more  money.  This 
additional  money  will  be  determined  by  your  choices,  by  choices  of  other  participants  in  the 
experiment and also by chance. 
  
The experiment has three parts. Before each part, we will let you know about the tasks as well as 
about how your decisions and those made by other participants will affect your payments.  
 
[Authors’ note to readers: The previous paragraph was omitted in the RU+T treatment] 
 
Everything you earn will be for you and paid in cash inside a closed envelope in a strictly private 
way at the end of the experimental session. 
 
Each participant has a strictly confidential "Experiment Code" to guarantee that no participant can 
identify another one by his/her decisions nor earnings. Researchers will observe each participant’s  
earnings at the end of the experiment but we will not associate your decisions with any participants’ 
names.  
 
Your Experiment Code is: XX 
 
The experiment consists of three parts. Your final payment will be the sum of a participation 
fee of the 3 euros plus whatever you earn in the three parts of the experiment. 
 
[Authors’ note to readers: The previous paragraph was omitted in the RU+T treatment] 
 
Each experimental point corresponds to 25 Euro cents. 
 
Thus, if you obtain a total of 32 points, you will receive a total of 11 euros (3 for participating 
and 8 from converting 32 experimental points into euros at a rate of 4 experimental point * 0.25 
= 1 Euro). 
 
If, for example, you obtain 10 experimental points, you will receive 5.5 Euros (10*0.25=2.5 + 3 
=5.5). 
 
If, for example, you obtain 70 experimental points, you will receive 20.5 Euros (70*0.25=17.5 + 
3 = 20.5). 
 
 [Authors’ note to readers: The following three sentences are relevant only for Parts 2 and 3 while 
this paper focuses exclusively on the results in Part 1] 
 
The 20 participants have been randomly divided into two groups of 10 subjects each: “group A” and 
“group B”. You belong to Group X.  
 
All participants in the experiment will do the same 3 PARTS. 
 
PART 1 is about to start. Please wait until everyone has read these instructions to read the 
instructions for PART 1. 
 
Instructions for Deciders’ Task 1 
 
PART 1  
In this part of the experiment we are going to show you 16 tables. The 16 tables the computer will 
show you will look as follows:  
 
  Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  8  4  11 
Receiver  17  19  23 
   19
In each of the tables you must choose between "Option 1", "Option 2" and "Option 3". Each of these 
3 options describes how many experimental points a participant ("Decider") receives and how many 
another randomly matched participant ("Receiver") gets. 
 
For each of the 16 tables you will be randomly matched with a different participant from your group. 
At no time a participant will know who they are matched with in any table.  
 
[Authors’ note to readers: in RU+T the instructions said: For each of the 16 tables you will be 
randomly matched with a different participant from this session.] 
 
When the experiment is over, the computer will randomly choose one of the 16 tables to determine 
the payments for PART 1. The computer will also randomly choose whether you are the “Decider” or 
the “Receiver”. That is, the computer will randomly choose if the option you have chosen in that 
particular table is implemented, so that you will be the “Decider” or, on the other hand, if the option 
chosen by the participant from your group with whom you are randomly matched in that particular 
table is implemented.  
 
In the case the computer assigns your option to be implemented you will receive the amount of 
experimental points corresponding to “Decider” in the chosen table and your matched participant will 
receive the number of experimental points corresponding to “Receiver” in the same table. 
 
For example, if the chosen table was the one that appears above, the computer determined that your 
option  is  the  one  to  be  implemented,  and  you  had  chosen  "Option  2",  you  would  obtain  4 
experimental points while your matched participant would obtain 19 experimental points. 
 
If, on the other hand, the chosen table was the one that appears above, the computer determined that 
the option chosen by your matched participant is the one to be implemented, and such participant had 
chosen "Option 1", you would obtain 17 experimental points while your matched participant would 
obtain 8 experimental points. 
 
Notice that the numbers in the example are just for illustrative purposes. They DO NOT intend 
to suggest how anyone may choose among the different options. 
 
Please notice that chance uniquely determines whether your role will be “Decider” or “Receiver”, 
once all participants have made their choices. Thus, the option you choose will only be taken into 
account  if  chance  finally  determines  that  for  a  particular  table  it  is  your  option  the  one  being 
implemented. In case in the chosen table your choice is not the one being implemented, your choice 
is simply not taken into account and no participant is informed of it. Therefore, in case your choice 
is  not  being  implemented,  your  choice  can  affect  in  no way  neither  your  payment  nor  the 
payments of any other participant.  
 
Once you have chosen your option in a particular table, please press "OK" and wait for the other 
participants to make their choice before moving to the next table. 
 
6.2 Understanding test taken by participants in the role uncertainty treatment 
with test (RU+T) 
 
Before starting, and in order to make sure that you have understood the instructions, we ask you to 
fill in the following two examples. Please use the following table to answer. 
 
  Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  2  10  8 




1.  The chosen table was the one that appears above. Assume you have chosen “Option 2” and your 
matched participant has chosen “Option 1”. The computer determines that your option is the one 
to be implemented. Then you would obtain __ experimental points and your matched participant 
would obtain __ experimental points. 
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[Authors’ note to readers: the correct answers are 10 and 8, respectively] 
 
2.  The chosen table was the one that appears above. Assume you have chosen “Option 1” and your 
matched participant has chosen “Option 3”. The computer determines that the option chosen by 
your matched participant is the one to be implemented. Then you would obtain __ experimental 
points and your matched participant would obtain __ experimental points. 
 
[Authors’ note to readers: the correct answers are 6 and 8, respectively] 
 
Please wait until we check your answers to make sure that you have understood the instructions. 
Once we have checked all answers, you will be able to start the experiment on the computer screen. 
 
Remember that in the experiment once you have chosen your option in a particular table, you must 
press "OK" and wait for the other participants to make their choice before moving to the next table. 
 
6.3. Instructions without Role Uncertainty (RC) 
 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN OUR EXPERIMENT! 
     
This is an experiment and thus, no talking, looking-around or walking is allowed. If you have any 
question or need help please raise your hand and one of the researchers will assist you. If you do not 
follow the indicated rules, WE WILL ASK YOU TO LEAVE THE EXPERIMENT AND YOU 
WILL NOT RECEIVE ANY PAYMENT. Thank you. 
 
This experiment is about individual decisions. Both Pompeu Fabra and  Autònoma de Barcelona 
universities have provided funds to carry it out. You will receive 3 euros for having arrived on 
time. Additionally, if you follow the instructions correctly you may earn more money. 
 
The experiment has three parts. Before each part, we will let you know about the tasks you have to 
do and how your decisions will affect your payments. Everything you earn will be for you and paid 
in cash inside a closed envelope in a strictly private way at the end of the experimental session. 
 
Each participant has a strictly confidential "Experiment Code" to guarantee that no participant can 
identify another one by his/her decisions nor earnings. Researchers will observe each participant’s  
earnings at the end of the experiment but we will not associate your decisions with any participants’ 
names.  
 
Your Experiment Code is: XX 
 
The experiment consists of three parts. Your final payment will be the sum of a participation 
fee of the 3 euros plus whatever you earn in the three parts of the experiment. 
 
Each experimental point corresponds to 25 Euro cents. 
 
Thus, if you obtain a total of 32 points, you will receive a total of 11 euros (3 for participating 
and 8 from converting 32 experimental points into euros at a rate of 4 experimental point * 0.25 
= 1 Euro). 
 
If, for example, you obtain 10 experimental points, you will receive 5.5 Euros (10*0.25=2.5 + 3 
=5.5). 
 
If, for example, you obtain 70 experimental points, you will receive 20.5 Euros (70*0.25=17.5 + 
3 = 20.5). 
  
There are 40 participants in this experiment, 20 in the laboratory to whom we refer to as “Deciders” 
and 20 in a classroom to whom we refer to as “Receivers”. 
 
As you have observed, who is a “Decider” (and stayed in the laboratory) and who is a “Receiver” 
(and went to the classroom) has been randomly decided by extracting a paper from a bag. 
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“Deciders” take decisions which affect their payments and the payments of other participants in the 
experiment. “Receivers” do not take any decision, which affect neither their payments nor those of 
other participants in the experiment. When the experiment concludes, we will first pay “Deciders” in 
private. Once “Deciders” have left, “Receivers” will come to the laboratory and will be paid in 
private. 
 
[Authors’ note to readers: The following two sentences are relevant only for Parts 2 and 3 while this 
paper focuses exclusively on the results in Part 1] 
 
The 20 “Deciders” have been divided in two groups of 10 subjects each: “group A” and “group B”. 
You belong to Group X. If you are a “Receiver” you do not belong to any group. 
 
PART 1 is about to start. Please wait until everyone has read the instructions for PART 1.  
 
 
Instructions for Deciders’ Task 1 
 
PART 1  
In this part of the experiment we are going to show you 16 tables. The 16 tables the computer will 




  Option 1  Option 2  Option 3 
Decider  8  7  11 
Receiver  17  19  13 
 
In each of the tables you must choose between "Option 1", "Option 2" and "Option 3". Each of these 
3 options describes how many experimental points a participant ("Decider") receives and how many 
another randomly matched participant ("Receiver") gets. 
 
At no time a participant will know who they are matched with in any table. 
 
When the experiment is over, the computer will randomly choose one of the 16 tables to determine 
the payments for PART 1. 
 
You will receive the amount of experimental points corresponding to “Decider” in the chosen table 
and  your  matched  participant  will  receive  the  number  of  experimental  points  corresponding  to 
“Receiver” in the same table. 
 
For example, if the chosen table was the one that appears above and you had chosen "Option 2", you 
would obtain 7 experimental points while your matched participant would obtain 19 experimental 
points. 
 
Notice that the numbers in the example are just for illustrative purposes. They DO NOT intend 
to suggest how anyone may choose among the different options. 
 
Participants in the other classroom (“Receivers”) can not take any decision which may affect your 
payments or their payments. 
 
What you earn and what your matched participant (“Receiver”) earns depends only on your decisions 
and on the randomly chosen table. 
 
Once you have chosen your option in a particular table, please press "OK" and wait for the other 
participants to make their choice before moving to the next table.  
 
6.4 Anonymous Questionnaire filled by all participants in all treatments: 
 
[Authors’ note to readers: In the RU+T treatment, questions 2 and 3 did not make any reference to 
other parts.] 
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1. What do you think about the experiment? 
2. How have you made your choices in each part of the experiment? 
3. How do you think others have made their choices in each part of the experiment? 
4. Are you satisfied with your earnings in the experiment? 
5. Gender. 
6. Age. 
7. What are you studying? 
8. Would you like to add any other comment? 
 
 